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has said, that amendment is concerned, "not with a private right,
but with a public power, a governmental responsibility. 0 5
HUGH B. ROGERS, JR.

Admission to the Bar-"Good Moral Character"Constitutional Protections
Traditionally, states have been free to set up bar admission standards as rigorous or as lenient as desired.' Thus, it is permissible
to require that the applicant for admission have graduated from law
school,2 that he swear to uphold state and federal constitutions8 , and
that he does not advocate violent overthrow of the government. 4
Perhaps the most important requirement established by every state
is that the applicant have "good moral character." 5 This requirement allows the states a great deal of discretion in determining who
will be admitted to the bar since the function of this requirement is
to insure that only those who have sufficiently high moral character
are allowed to practice law.' Any determination of character is clearly a discretionary determination.' Since the state impliedly warrants
245.

" Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup.

CT. REv.

.See Note, 106 U. PA. L. Rnv. 753, 755 (1958).
'E.g., Ex parte Florida State Bar Ass'n, 148 Fla. 725, 5 So. 2d 1 (1941).
'In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
' Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957) (by implication). All
fifty states require the applicant to show nonadvocacy of violent overthrow
of the government. See RULES FOR ADmISSION TO THE BAR (West 38th ed.

1963).

'See RULES FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR (West 38th ed. 1963); 64
A.L.R.2d 301 (1959); Jackson, CharacterRequirements for Admission to
the Bar, 20 FoRDHAm L. REv. 305 (1951). Besides use of the term "good
moral character," courts draw analogy and support from the term "moral
turpitude," i.e., if there is "moral turpitude," there is a lack of "good moral
character." See Bradway, Moral Turpitude as the Criterion of Offenses
that Justify Disbarment,24 CALIF. L. REv. 9 (1935).
' See Comment, 15 STAN. L. REv. 500, 511 (1963) to the effect that
the high moral character required is one that would enable the attorney to
decide what is "right" for professional conduct as distinguished from private
conduct.
I As to what considerations should be taken into account in deciding
this question, see Starrs, Considerations on Determination of Good Moral
Character,2 CATHOLIC LAW. 161 (1956). As to whether a judge or other
decision maker should follow his own convictions or that of the public in
determining "good moral character," see Cahn, Authority and Responsibility, 51 COLUm. L. REv. 838 (1951).
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to its citizens that they can place their trust in the profession, this
requirement allows the state to fulfill this function.' Further, it has
been noted that while one can acquire legal learning through experience, a person admitted to the bar who has poor moral character will
likely remain soY
Notwithstanding the state's interest in the protection of the public, the interests of the individual applicant have been recognized.
In two 1957 cases the United States Supreme Court for the first
time reversed bar admission denials. In Konigsberg v. State Bar0
the Court recognized the usefulness of the requirement of "good
moral character" but noted that "[s] uch a vague qualification, which
is easily adapted to fit personal views and predilections, can be a
dangerous instrument for arbitrary and discriminatory denial of the
right to practice law."" In the companion case of Schware v. Board
of Bar Examiners" the Court held:
A State can require high standards of qualification, such as good
moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar, but any qualification must have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law....
Even in applying permissible standards, officers of a State cannot
exclude an applicant when there is no basis for their finding that
he fails to meet these standards, or when their action is invidiously discriminatory. 18
In Schware, evidence that Schware had been a member of the communist Party, had been arrested but never indicted for "suspicion
of criminal syndicalism" because of his participation in the 1934
labor disputes at California shipyards, and had used aliases was not
sufficient to justify a finding that Schware was unfit to practice law.
And in Konigsberg, evidence of alleged past membership in the
Communist Party, together with Konigsberg's refusal to answer
questions about this, did not warrant the committee in concluding
that Konigsberg was not of sufficient moral character and was disloyal to state and federal governments in light of the fact that
Konigsberg repeatedly denied that he ever espoused violent over' See Comment, 15

STAN. L. REv. 500, 511 (1963).
'In re Farmer, 191 N.C. 235, 238-40, 131 S.E. 661, 663-64 (1926),
citing In re Applicants for License, 143 N.C. 1, 55 S.E. 635 (1906).
10353 U.S. 252 (1957).
1
Id. at 263.
12353 U.S. 232 (1957).
8 Id. at 239.
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throw of the government and in good faith based his refusal to answer the questions of whether he had ever been in the Party on the
fifth amendment.
A recent case applied the Schware holding. In Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners4 the California Supreme Court reversed
a finding of the committee below that the applicant was not of sufficient moral character to practice law. The applicant had been denied
admission because of his participation in civil rights demonstrations,
with subsequent convictions for unlawful assembly, disturbing the
peace, trespass to obstruct dawful business, and unlawful entry.15
The committee of examiners thought the applicant had "shown a
disrespect for the law and judicial officers, which exceeds the bounds
of his acknowledged right to hold and espouse, to advocate, advertise, and to participate in mass demonstrations to achieve the acceptance of any social, political or philosophical views of beliefs in a
peaceful and non-violent manner."' 6
The California Supreme Court reversed because it felt a "clear
analogy" existed between the facts in Schware and Hallinan. In
Schware the applicant was arrested for, but never convicted of a
violation of the Neutrality Act of 1917 which made it unlawful for
a person within the United States to join or to hire others to join
the army of any foreign state. The Court in Schware reasoned that
even if Schware had violated the Neutrality Act of 1917, this would
not indicate a lack of good moral character since "[in] any persons
in this country actively supported the Spanish Loyalist Government... many idealistic young men volunteered to help causes they
believed right."' 7 Likewise, the court in Hallinan reasoned that
since many legal scholars and other eminent people, as well as ideal" 55 Cal. Rptr. 228, 421 P.2d 76 (1966).
The committee listed other grounds, the gist of which was that the

1"

applicant had shown a tendency "to employ against the persons and property
of others unreasonable physical force and the threat thereof." Id. at 231, 421
P.2d at 79 n.2. The California Supreme Court examined the applicant's
prior history of fist fights and concluded this was insufficient to deny admission because such acts could be classified as "adolescent behavior" and
had no direct relationship to the practice of law. Id. at 245, 421 P.2d at 93.
The court also regarded petitioner's failure to mention his participation in
a will contest and conviction in England for blocking a footpath as de
minhns "[iln view of the extensive list of arrests which petitioner did
include in his bar application. . . ." Id. at 247, 421 P.2d at 95.
'aId.at 231, 421 P.2d at 79 n.2.
TId. at 238, 421 P.2d at 86, citing Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,

353 U.S. 232, 242 (1957).
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istic youth, shared the applicant's belief, it could not be said that the
applicant lacked "good moral character."'" Criminal prosecution,
not exclusion from the bar, was the manner of punishment appropriate here. 9 The court felt that the applicant would not "obstruct
the administration of justice or otherwise act unscrupulously in his
capacity as an officer of the court."2
Although Hallinan did not involve the situation where the applicant refuses to answer committee inquiries, cases dealing with this
problem have clearly shown that the applicant's protections are not
based on any clearly defined right, but are the result of a balancing
of interests. In the second Konigsberg case, 1 it was held that since
Konigsberg was warned of possible exclusion if he did not answer
the questions from the committee about his alleged past Communist
Party membership, it did not violate the fourteenth amendment
when he was excluded because of his silence since the question was
material and there would be "no likelihood that deterrence of asso-

ciation may result ..

*"22

The Court reached the same result in

2 8
Analagously, the Court in a disbarment proceedIn re Anastaplo.
ing held that the due process clause was not violated when the attorney was disbarred on the basis of his refusal to answer inquiries.24 These cases did not overrule Schware and the first Konigsberg case because neither committee drew unfavorable inferences
from the silence, as had happened in the first Konigsberg case, but
denied admission on the ground that the applicant was non-cooperative in refusing to answer questions put to him.25

IsId. at 238-39, 431 P.2d at 86-87.
201Id. at 239, 421 P.2d at 87.
Id.at 239, 421 P.2d at 87.
" Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
22Id.at 52.
23 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
Anastaplo also refused to answer questions about
his alleged past membership in the Communist Party. Although there was
"substantial character evidence altogether favorable to Anastaplo, there is
nothing in the Federal Constitution which required the Committee to draw
the curtain upon its investigation at that point." Id. at 95. The rationale
of the court seemed to be that the applicant was best "circumstanced to
supply" information about his past. Id. at 90. For a complete discussion
of the problem of loyalty, see Brown & Fassett, Loyalty Tests for Admission,
to the Bar, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 480 (1953).
2 Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961). See note 32 infra.
"But justice Black's dissent in Konigsberg points out the inconsistency
between the first Konigsberg case and the second one:
The majority avoids the otherwise unavoidable necessity of reversing the judgment below on that ground [the test of the 1957 cases]
by simply refusing to look beyond the reason given by the Commit-
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Some writers maintain that these cases mean only that the Court
was unwilling to find an arbitrary or discriminatory exclusion.2"
Nevertheless, the state's power to exclude because of the applicant's
refusal to answer questions actually gives the state a technique of
exclusion for any undisclosed reason since in any given case application of the rule is still discretionary. Take the case of two silent
applicants. If the committee wanted to exclude both, it could; but
if only one were excluded, then it is apparent that considerations
other than just the silence of the applicant come into play. And
under the 1961 cases the real reason for exclusion could not be
detrmined2
Others have suggested that the Court feared the unique opportunity that the legal profession presents to the Communist Party,2"
but the more sensible view is that the Court was balancing the interests of state regulation verses individual freedom.2 9 To accept the
argument of the applicant that he should be allowed to remain silent
would in effect shift the burden of proof from the applicant to the
committee which is ill-equipped to investigate the applicant's past."0
tee to justify Konigsberg's rejection.

In this way, the majority

reaches the question as to whether the Committee can constitutionally

reject Konigsberg for refusing to answer questions growing out of

his conjectured past membership in the Communist Party even though
it could not constitutionally reject him if he did answer those ques-

tions and his answers happened to be affirmative.
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 60 (1961).
" See Comment, 47 IowA L. REv. 507, 513 (1962).
" See Note, 64 W. VA. L. R. v. 70, 74 (1961).
" See Comment, 47 IowA L. REv. 507, 513 (1962).
" Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, said: "Whenever, in such a

context, these constitutional protections are asserted against the exercise of

valid governmental powers a reconciliation must be effected, and that perforce requires an appropriate weighing of the respective interests involved."
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 51 (1961).
See Note, 15 VAND. L. REv. 634, 634-37 (1962) in which it was sug-

gested that in such a context, that is, in the area of state investigations for
a public job, or some license, or benefit, two groups of cases appear: (1)
Where the question asked is justified to protect the state's interest but the

answers are of so little probative value in regard to determining fitness
that exclusion here is arbitrary and unreasonable, e.g., Schware v. Board
of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 252 (1957). (2) Where the question itself is
so unrelated to any state interest that it is arbitrary to ask the question,
e.g., Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (compulsory disclosure of
NAACP membership lists under city occupational license tax held unconstitutional); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)

(membership lists of NAACP not relevant to a determination of fitness to

conduct intrastate business).
"oHowever, it is at least questionable whether the ultimate burden of
persuasion is shifted to the committee. The court in Konigsberg distin-
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Furthermore, the Court appeared to fear that the Supreme Court
would become a "super state supreme court of appeals.""
This balancing of interests in regard to the fifth amendment is
now subject to question since the recent case of Spevack v. Klein32
overruled Cohen. Although Spevack held only that the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment applied to state disbarment
proceedings through the fourteenth amendment, disbarment is not
so dissimilar from admission proceedings that Spevack could not
be used analogously to overrule the second Konigsberg case and In
re Anastaplo.3 3 Furthermore, if one assumes that the state policy
behind either proceeding is the same-to maintain high ethical
standards in the profession for the protection of the public-it would
likewise appear that the issue of whether the first and fifth amendments should apply to admission proceedings is basically the same.
guished Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), which held that it was a
violation of due process to require taxpayers to prove their nonadvocacy
of violent overthrow of the government in order to receive tax exemptions,
from the burden of proof required for bar admission. While in Speiser the
taxpayer had the ultimate burden of persuasion, the applicant for bar admission had only the burden of coming forward with the evidence; thus,
there was a greater threat to the individual in Speiser since the taxpayer
would have to disclose more information than the applicant would have to
give in the Konigsberg situation. But if this is so, only the burden of
coming forward is shifted to the committee. Thus, it appears to be less of
a handicap to the committee, assuming it already has the ultimate burden of
persuasion.
It is also questionable whether the Court, speaking through Justice Harlan, was correct in implying that the committee has the ultimate burden
of proof. Most states place the burden of proof on the applicant, See Note,
106 U. PA. L. REv. 753 n.4 (1958). Even if the applicant still has it,
California Supreme Court Justice Traynor suggests that the exclusionary
rule should be applied only where there is a prima facie espousal of communist theory, or for that matter any question of fact in issue. Konigsberg
v. State Bar, 52 Cal. 2d 769, 774-78, 344 P.2d 777, 780-83 (1959) (dissenting opinion). This would mean that the applicant could be silent about
certain matters if he has already put in evidence sufficient to rebut any prima
facie case made by the committee.
But see Sprecher, Bar Admission Agencies: Their Right to be Informed,
51 A.B.AJ. 248 (1965).
"I"[O]ur function here is solely one of constitutional adjudication, not
to pass on what has been done as if we were another state court of review,
still less to express any view upon the wisdom of the State's action." It re
Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 97 (1961). See Comment, 56 Micir. L. REv. 415,
424-25 (1958).
"87 S. Ct. 625 (1967).
The court in Spevack said: "In this context [disbarment proceedings]
'penalty' is not restricted to fine or imprisonment. It means . . . the imposition of any sanction which makes assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege 'costly."' Id. at 628. The argument would be that exclusion is as
"costly" as disbarment.
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The Court has had less trouble in sustaining procedural protections for the applicant. In Willner v. Committee on Ctaracter &
Fitness3 4 the applicant was denied admission on the basis of an adverse and confidential trial report from a committee of lawyers.
Willner was not allowed to examine this report nor was he told of
the charges it contained. The New York State Court of Appeals
denied Willner's petition for a hearing on the charges. On certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court, it was held: "petitioner was denied procedural due process when he was denied admission to the Bar
by the Appellate Division without a hearing on the charges filed
against him before either the Committee or the Appellate Division." 5
Although it might appear somewhat unclear whether a right to a
hearing includes the right of confrontation and cross-examination, a
recent case had no trouble in finding that this was a part of the Willner case."0 State courts have also insisted that the applicant have procedural protection. 7
Thus, except for the procedural right to a hearing, the Court
has established no standards for the committees to follow. Although
Schware established the requirement of a "rational connection,"
cases relying on Schware do not make it clear whether the reversal
of the exclusion is based on a finding that the committee used a
qualification that has no rational connection with the applicant's fitness or whether the committee was reversed because it excluded
when there was no basis for their finding that the applicant failed
to meet the standards. 3s Having no guides as to what is a "rational
connection" between the question asked and the determination of
whether the applicant has good moral character, committees can ask
questions that have little relevance to the ultimate determination to
be made. This is harmful in two ways. In the first place, such questioning can subject the applicant to invasions of purely private mat'373 U.S. 96 (1963). Compare Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959)
with Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).

373 U.S. at 106.
'Application of Levine, 97 Ariz. 88, 397 P.2d 205 (1964).
"See e.g., Application of Burke, 87 Ariz. 336, 351 P.2d 169 (1960);
Application of Kellar, 81 Nev. 240, 401 P.2d 616 (1965); In re Crum, 103
Ore. 296, 204 P. 948 (1922).
" A possible exception is Florida Bar v. Wilkes, 179 So. 2d 193 (1965).
The court, relying on Schware in a disbarment proceeding, ruled that the
mere belief in existentialist philosophy did not show that the applicant was
unfit to practice law.
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ters. 9 Secondly, such irrational questioning can deter freedoms of
expression and association.4" In Hallinan, would it be unreasonable
to assume that future applicants would at least be leary of participation in civil rights demonstrations? Part of Justice Harlan's rationale in refusing to allow the applicant to use the fifth amendment
was that no deterrence of association would result. But is this
realistic since the applicant has spent the last few years preparing
for entry into the legal profession and it is always questionable
whether an appellate court will reverse the exclusion in question?
Thus, the ultimate responsibility for establishing proper standards
to see if the applicant has "good moral character" lies with the bar
examining committee.
WAILACE

C. TYSER, JR.

Antitrust Law-Horizontal Mergers-Section 7 of the
Clayton Act
In United States v. Von's Grocery Co.,' the Supreme Court
struck down a horizontal merger2 as a violation of Section 7 of the
Clayton Act. In March of 1960, when Von's, the third largest retail
grocery chain in the Los Angeles area, purchased the sixth largest,
the United States brought action charging an antitrust violation.
At trial, the District Court decided that from "the evidence, it cannot be concluded that the merger in question would probably lessen
competition in the metropolitan area either at the time of the mergr
U.S. 479 (1965).
"oSee Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
"0Justice Black said in the first Konigsberg case: "It is also important
both to society and the bar itself that lawyers be unintimidated-free to
think, speak, and act as members of an Independent Bar." Konigsberg v.
State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 273 (1957). See Brown & Fassett, Loyalty Tests
for Admission to the Bar, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 480, 501 (1953). Another
bad result is the attitude such questioning produces in the applicants. It
perhaps tends to make them give only the "right" answers. Ibid. This is
bad not only because the applicant feels he has to hide some belief, but also
because it will hinder the committee from reaching conclusions based on
truthful answers.
'384 U.S. 270 (1966).

'A horizontal merger is a merger between two companies that compete
directly in similar economic functions, while a vertical merger is one between companies that buy or sell the product of the other, and a conglomerate merger is between companies that have no direct relationship with
each other.

